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Abstract
Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants and seeing through their im-
plications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it
incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its
consequences for contractual design.
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In mainstream contract theory, thinking about contingencies, designing covenants and
seeing through their implications is costless. Contracts written by parties accordingly are
eﬃcient subject to explicit informational and participation constraints (complete contract
theory) or within some given contracting set (incomplete contract theory). Contracts
are never too detailed or too long.1 Stylized facts such as the beneﬁts of economizing
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1In certain circumstances, optimal complete contracts take the form of “simple contracts” (e.g., Yeon-
Koo Che and Donald B. Hausch 1999, Oliver Hart and John Moore 1999, Eric S. Maskin and Jean Tirole
1999a, Georg N¨ oldeke and Klaus M. Schmidt 1995, Ilya R. Segal 1999). Similarly, short-term contracts
may duplicate the outcome of optimal long-term contracts (e.g., Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton
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1on contract completeness under relationship interactions (Stewart Macaulay 1963) or
vertical integration (Oliver E. Williamson 1985), or the higher cost of negotiating long-
term contracts (Timo V¨ alil¨ a 2005) live in a theoretical vacuum.
By contrast, the less formal bounded rationality approach (Herbert A. Simon 1955,
Williamson 1975, 1985) recognizes the cost of gathering and processing information and
emphasizes the use of heuristics in contract design. This paper aims at narrowing the gap
between these two strands. It follows the bounded rationality approach by accounting for
cognitive limitations; but like mainstream theory, it takes a rational choice approach to
contracting: Parties are unaware, but aware that they are unaware.
Its general thrust goes as follows: The parties to a contract (buyer, seller) initially
avail themselves of an available design, perhaps an industry standard. This design or
contract is the best contract under existing knowledge. The parties however are unaware
of the contract’s implications, but they realize that something may go wrong with this
contract; indeed they may exert cognitive eﬀort in order to ﬁnd out about what may
go wrong and how to draft the contract accordingly: Put diﬀerently, a contingency is
foreseeable (perhaps at a prohibitively high cost), but not necessarily foreseen. To take
a trivial example, the event that the oil price may increase, implying that the contract
should be indexed on it, is perfectly foreseeable, but this does not imply that parties will
think about this possibility and index the contract price accordingly.
This approach delivers two immediate implications that contrast with traditional con-
tract theory: First, there are transaction costs of negotiating deals. Second, complete
contracts may be wasteful contracts. Individual interests lead parties to ﬁne-tune the
contract whenever contract incompleteness could put them in a situation of being held
up ex post. Completing contracts thus involves rent-seeking.
In this paper an incomplete contract is a contract specifying the available design and is
renegotiated whenever this design turns out not to be appropriate. To derive predictions
as to when contracts are likely to follow the available design and later be renegotiated,
I develop a speciﬁc illustration of this broader theme. A buyer and a seller can contract
for delivery of a known good or design A. This speciﬁcation may or may not be what
will suit the buyer’s need. In the latter case, a diﬀerent, initially unknown speciﬁcation
A  delivers more surplus to the buyer provided that the seller collaborates. At the initial
stage, though, the parties are aware only of A, although they know that it may not be
the right design. Each may, before contracting, incur a cognitive cost to think about
alternatives to A. A party who ﬁnds out that design A  is the appropriate one chooses
whether to disclose the existence of (to describe) this design to the other party.
Second, and following Kenneth J. Arrow’s (1962) insight about the diﬃculty of licens-
ing trade secrets and that of Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson (2006) about shrouded
attributes, I posit that the enunciation of A  is an “eye-opener”; the very description of
A  reveals that the state of nature is indeed such that A  rather than A is optimal. Put
diﬀerently, a party’s suggestion of contracting on A  gives the information away and pre-
vents the knowledgeable party from fully beneﬁting from it, in the same way that Arrow’s
2licensor cannot extract any royalties from the prospective licensee or Gabaix and Laib-
son’s supplier prefers to keep some contract attributes shrouded rather than mentioning
the likely add-on and committing to its price.
Such “awareness-inducing information” is related to, but distinct from the familiar
concept of “hard information”. In a standard hard-information model, the parties would
be fully aware of the existence of designs A and A , but would be uncertain as to their
respective payoﬀs (which one is appropriate); the contract can then be made contingent
on one of the parties’ bringing hard information that A  is appropriate. No such contract
is feasible here since the description of A  simultaneously reveals the state of nature. My
assumption implies that a party cannot charge the other party just for having come up
with an alternative design.
This paper deﬁnes contract incompleteness in the following way: A contract is more
incomplete if fewer resources are expended to identify the appropriate design; equivalently,
contract incompleteness is measured by the probability that the design speciﬁed in the
contract needs to be altered ex post. Transaction costs may be wastefully incurred, as it is
in the parties’ individual interest to know whether they are vulnerable to (or will beneﬁt
from) renegotiation. By contrast, adjustment costs vindicate some cognitive investments
from a social point of view. Thus two eﬀects move the buyer away from optimal search.
The ﬁrst is the desire to avoid being held up ex post and forced to pay extra to adjust the
contract. The second is the discount given at the outset by the seller, anticipating hold
up for the standard contract; this discount lessens the buyer’s incentives to move away
from it.
The paper is an inquiry into what drives equilibrium transaction costs. Its main
insights can be summarized in the following way. As already pointed out:
1. Cognition is a natural source of adverse selection in contractual relationships.
2. Contracts may be too complete, that is, there may be too much, not too little infor-
mation brought to bear on the design. Rent-seeking, and not only the avoidance of ex
post contract adjustments, drives individual incentives for cognition.
I further show that:
3. Parties to a contract tend to specialize in identifying potential bad news for them-
selves/good news for the other party. For example, a seller may not have much incen-
tives to reveal problems with the design; indeed, a central reason for a seller to look
for problems is that if she does not ﬁnd any, she might hesitate to go through with the
transaction. Accordingly, I derive the conditions under which a party does not search
for bad news for the other party.
4. Ex ante competition need not reduce transaction costs.
5. Contracts are predicted to be strictly less complete under relational contracting or
under vertical integration. Furthermore long-term contracting may be strictly sub-
optimal. Thus, relational contracting, vertical integration and short-term contracting
3generate (are not only responses to) contract incompleteness; this reverse causality has
implications for empirical work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I. relates the paper to the literature. Section
II. develops the framework, and analyzes its implications when only one party can engage
in cognitive eﬀort (section II.A on one-sided cognition) and when both parties can (section
II.B on two-sided cognition). Section III. analyzes the robustness of the conclusions.
Section III.A allows for multiple sellers. Section III.B looks at mechanisms that can aﬀect
ex post bargaining powers. Section IV. shows that contract incompleteness is implied by
(and, as noted earlier, is not only a driver of) repeated relationships, the possibility of
vertical integration and short-term contracting. And section V. concludes.
I. Relationship to the literature
The paper borrows unrestrainedly from and brings together several strands of the contract
literature.
With Kathryn Spier (1992) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006), it shares the view that
contract incompleteness is related to asymmetric information. In Spier,2 an informed
party may not want to make the outcome contingent on certain known adverse contin-
gencies by fear of signaling to the other party that these contingencies have high likelihood.
Gabaix and Laibson’s emphasis on the hold-up associated with add-ons that the buyer is
unaware of is closely connected to the problematic considered here. On the other hand,
none of these two papers has cognitive costs, and contracts are too incomplete, not too
complete according to my deﬁnition.3
Ronald A. Dye (1985) modeled contract incompleteness by introducing a ﬁxed cost
per contingency included in the contract. This approach was criticized on the grounds
that a well-formulated contingency may be cheap to include in a contract and that it is
unclear why writing costs should be proportional to the number of contingencies (Hart
and Bengt Holmstr¨ om 1987). In a sense, this paper follows Dye’s impetus and attempts
at opening Dye’s black box of costs of writing complete contracts.4 And to use Benjamin
2See also Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Frankin Allen and Douglas Gale (1992). Luca Anderlini
Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite (2006) extend this approach by letting a court rule out certain
forms of contract in order to maximize ex ante welfare.
3Contracts are incomplete in David Martimort and Salvatore Piccolo (2008) for a diﬀerent reason:
There, the parties to the contract are engaged in a game with another vertical structure. Committing to
an incomplete contract modiﬁes the latter’s behavior and may turn out to be beneﬁcial (see also Glenn
Ellison 2005). That paper has no cognitive costs either.
Another factor of contract renegotiation is their imperfect enforcement by courts: see J. Luis Guasch,
Jean-Jacques Laﬀont and St´ ephane Straub (2006) for a model and empirical evidence.
4Other papers that have built and improved on Dye’s approach are Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999)
and Pierpaolo Battigalli and Giovanni Maggi (2002), which take a rather diﬀerent approach from that
followed here.
4Klein (2002)’s terminology, it focuses on “search costs” (the costs of thinking through
the contracts’ implications) while Dye analyzes “ink costs” (the costs of actually writing
contracts).
In Jacques Cr´ emer, Fahad Khalil and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998a,b), a party engages
in rent-seeking information acquisition before contracting. Similarly, the paper shares with
Jack Hirshleifer (1971) the insight that contracts may suﬀer from an excess provision of
information. None of these contributions, though, deals with the renegotiation and hold-
up associated with contracts built on imperfect cognition, and so the economic focus is
accordingly diﬀerent.
The paper borrows from the classic contributions of Sanford J. Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Williamson (1985) and from the subsequent literature
on investment speciﬁcity the idea that contractual choices impact the extent of ex post
hold-ups. The paper considers pre-contractual investments, while the literature focuses on
post-contractual ones. Many contributions to incomplete contract theory posit foreseen,
observable but unveriﬁable contingencies or actions. In line with the general approach of
Maskin (1999), the challenge is then, if possible, to make veriﬁable what is observable.5
Renegotiation of a baseline contract (Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein 1996, Che
and Hausch 1999) may do the trick; message spaces must not be too small (Douglas B.
Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston 1998). And there always exists a contract with large
enough message spaces that yields the optimal allocation if unrenegotiated; renegotiation
at best is innocuous or else lowers welfare (Hart and Moore 1988, Maskin and Moore
1999). In contrast with this literature, which ignores ex ante cognition, this paper focuses
on the coarseness of the information on which the contract builds and links contract
completeness to the transaction costs incurred in designing the contract.
Finally, the paper is most closely related to interesting and independent work by Bolton
and Antoine Faure-Grimaud (2007) on the relationship between information acquisition
and contracts. That paper builds on their 2005 paper, in which a single decision-maker
may choose to incur delay costs (the counterparts of our cognitive costs) in order to take
better decisions. The 2005 paper depicts individual decision-making as a bandit problem,
in which thinking ahead to deﬁne a complete action -plan enables the individual to react
more promptly to a new event, but delays initial decisions. There is no direct transaction
cost, but delay is incurred while waiting for information to accrue. The 2007 paper applies
these ideas to two-party contracting. Actions are known from the start but parties are
initially uncertain about the payoﬀs attached to a risky action and must choose between
this action and a safe one with known consequences. The parties may have a disagreement
as to when to select an action (even if they happen to rank the actions similarly). Due to
non-transferable utility, the more impatient party cannot compensate the other for acting
quickly. Interestingly, Bolton and Faure-Grimaud show that the impatient party may
deliberately transfer control to the more patient/cautious one. Their paper and this one
5Early models of observable but unveriﬁable performances include Bengt Holmstr¨ om (1982) and
Cr´ emer (1995).
5share the view that the pursuit of individual interests may make contracts too complete;6
the two papers are complementary as they use diﬀerent modeling techniques and stress
rather diﬀerent themes.
II. Cognitive limitations and equilibrium contracts
Let us ﬁrst describe the model.
Designs. A buyer (B) and a seller (S) contract on the delivery of a good. Initially they
can avail themselves of common-knowledge design A. This design (or for that matter an
alternative design) costs c for the seller to produce and deliver to the buyer. I assume
that c is large enough that the seller will insist on a contract before delivering any design:
The seller would not want to invest c in the absence of a contract by fear of a hold-up.
With probability 1 − ρ,d e s i g nA is the appropriate design and delivers utility v>c
to the buyer. For example, in an industry where there is a standard form contract from
which the parties can depart, ρ would capture how well the standard form contract ﬁts a
typical transaction.
With probability ρ, however, some other, initially undescribable,7 design A  delivers
utility v to the buyer while A delivers only v − Δ, where Δ > 0. Converting A into
A  requires the seller’s collaboration; the seller’s supplemental cost of this conversion or
“adjustment cost” is equal to a ∈ [0,Δ). That is, gains from renegotiation are Δ−a.B y
contrast, if design A  is identiﬁed at the contracting stage, the total cost of production is
c: there is no adjustment cost.8
The adjustment cost a can be interpreted in several ways. If A and A  refer to physical
designs such as computer codes or characteristics of an engine, the move from A to A 
may involve rewriting lines of code or making the already developed engine consistent
with the new specs, involving costs that would have been avoided, had the specs being
chosen right initially. If A and A  refer to pure contract design (covenants, indexation,
etc.), then the adjustment cost may be thought of as the real cost brought about by
surprises in liquidity positions or by suboptimal risk sharing. In either case, a can also
stand for the transaction costs or the risk of negotiation breakdown involved in drafting
a new contract.
For example, in a technology licensing interpretation, the seller licenses a technology
6In Bolton and Faure-Grimaud, the contract is incomplete if it does not specify which action is taken
once investment is sunk and the state of nature is revealed; that is, there is scope for further learning
before the actual decision is selected.
7The model is thus in the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1999b), in that the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities are known, but actions or contingencies may not be describable (they are just “numbers”).
8We locate the uncertainty on the buyer’s value. Symmetrically, one could assume that the value is
always v, and that the seller’s cost of producing is c if A is appropriate and c+Δ (which can be reduced
back to c at cost a for the buyer by switching to design A  if A is not appropriate). The roles of the seller
and the buyer would then be reversed. Section II.B combines the two forms of hold-up.
6to the buyer. To implement the technology to full functionality for his own use, though,
the buyer may or may not need a license to another patent owned by the seller that he
was not aware of. In a procurement interpretation, the authority may discover later on
that the speciﬁed design does not ﬁt his need and that further work may be demanded
from the contractor. Finally, the model has an interpretation in terms of the implications
of a given contract. Suppose that the contract describes a course of action, but that it
may be feasible for the seller to achieve the same contractual requirement in a way that
is both cheaper for her and less attractive to the buyer. Assuming that the seller’s cost
savings associated with perfunctory provision of the output is smaller than the buyer’s
loss in surplus, the buyer then will renegotiate with the seller to adhere to the spirit, if
not the letter of the contract.
We assume that design A generates gains from trade even in the absence of cognition:
v − c − ρa > 0.
Contract renegotiation. If the contract speciﬁes the trade of design A  at some price p,
then it is implemented without any renegotiation: The seller incurs cost c, delivers the
good and the buyer obtains utility v.
By contrast, when the contract speciﬁes design A, the seller incurs cost c, delivers
A, and the buyer takes possession of it. The buyer then learns whether the design is
appropriate. If not, he renegotiates with the seller in order to obtain the adjustment to
A .
We will assume that the buyer and the seller have bargaining power β and σ, respec-
tively (β + σ = 1), where a party’s bargaining power measures the share of the gains
from trade that the party can secure in a negotiation. That is, we apply the generalized
Nash bargaining solution with weights β and σ. For notational simplicity, the bargaining
powers are the same ex ante and ex post. Obviously, this assumption can no longer be
sustained when we consider ex ante competition.
Because we will in most of the paper make assumptions that guarantee the existence
of a pure-strategy equilibrium and therefore symmetric information on the equilibrium
path, the Nash bargaining solution is always well-deﬁned. A possible interpretation of
the Nash bargaining solution is that the two parties engage in sequential bargaining (with
frequencies of oﬀers β and σ, say) and do not update their beliefs when made oﬀ-the-
equilibrium path oﬀers: See footnote 13 below.
Transaction costs. Before contracting, the buyer and the seller can incur thinking or
cognitive costs TB(b)a n dTS(s), respectively.9 If A is the appropriate design, they learn
9As in Mathias Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) for example, the cost of cognition is depicted as a
sampling cost. The idea is that, through a combination of cognitive attention and the usual cognitive
mechanisms (inference, associativeness, etc.), the agents may stumble on (become aware of) implications
of the current design and an alternative to it.
7nothing from their investigation; if A  is the appropriate design, they learn A  with proba-
bility b and s, respectively; they learn nothing with probability 1−b and 1−s. The choices
b and s are unobserved by the other party and are individually rational. The functions
Ti (for i ∈{ B,S}) are smooth, increasing and convex functions such that Ti(0) = 0,
T  
i(0) = 0 and Ti(1) = +∞. To guarantee that the solution of (4) below is unique and
thereby shorten the analysis, we further make the following, maintained assumption:
Assumption 1. T   
B(b) >
ρ2(1 − ρ)σΔ
(1 − ρb)2 for all b ∈ [0,1].
Furthermore, and as discussed in the introduction, the enunciation of A  by i fully
reveals to j  = i that the proper design is A .
Cognitive costs have a broad range of interpretations, including the managers’ psychic
cost of focusing on issues they are unfamiliar with, their opportunity cost of not devoting
time to other important activities, or the fees paid to lawyers and consultants for advice
on contracting.10 The magnitude of cognitive costs is also revealed indirectly by the
substantial incompleteness of many contracts and by the costs of this incompleteness.
The timing is summarized in Figure 1.
Parties incur
cognitive costs
Ti(·), learn A 
or nothing
Contract
design
(speciﬁcation,
price)
Seller produces
speciﬁed design at
cost c
Buyer takes
possession of
good
[If A is not
appropriate]
renegotiation and
adjustment
Figure 1 : Timeline
The timing assumption that the buyer ﬁrst takes delivery and possession of the good
and then discovers whether the design is appropriate (he gets v if A is appropriate and
v−Δ if it is not and the contract is not renegotiated), rules out complex schemes in which
the buyer’s willingness to pay for the service is elicited prior to actual delivery. One can
for example imagine that the buyer appropriates the know-how when consuming the good
or that the buyer at that stage really needs the good and cannot credibly dispense with
it.
We will say that the contract is more incomplete if the ex ante probability that it
speciﬁes the available design A is higher.
A One-sided cognition
Let us assume in a ﬁrst step that only the buyer has the ability to learn about the
appropriate design. For example, the buyer may have an easier access to information
about what he really needs. More fundamentally, we will later observe that there is a
10For example, a water concession contract may be a few thousand page long.
8fundamental asymmetry between the buyer’s and the seller’s incentives to search for a
potential hold up by the seller.
The socially eﬃcient level of cognition  b equalizes the marginal cost of thinking and
its marginal beneﬁt (the avoidance of the adjustment cost a when A  is the appropriate
design):
T
 
B( b)=ρa.
When the adjustment from A to A  is costless (a = 0), then any investment in cognition
is pure rent-seeking in this model; that is, the socially optimal levels of cognitive eﬀorts
are equal to 0. We will more generally investigate whether the provision of cognitive eﬀort
is subject to free riding (has a public good ﬂavor).
(a) Deterministic cognition region
Let us ﬁrst look for a pure-strategy equilibrium. Let b∗ denote the equilibrium prob-
ability that the buyer discovers that A is not appropriate when this is indeed the case.
Suppose that the buyer learns nothing. The contract then speciﬁes delivery of design
A.L e t
 ρ(b) ≡
ρ(1 − b)
1 − ρb
denote the posterior probability that A is not appropriate conditional on cognitive inten-
sity b and unawareness. If A  is the appropriate design, the seller captures a fraction σ of
the renegotiation gain, creating a hold-up11
h ≡ σ(Δ − a).
Thus, everything is as if the buyer were able to make the adjustment himself, and so
receive v − a, but had to pay a “tax” h to the seller.
On the equilibrium path, b = b∗ and the buyer and the seller both expect a hold-up
beneﬁt (for the seller) or cost (for the buyer)  ρ(b∗)h. The ex ante price p(b∗) for design A
accounts for the possible hold-up, and so12
σ

v − c −  ρ(b
∗)a

= p(b
∗) −

c −  ρ(b
∗)h

, (1)
11As we will see, this model exhibits another hold up: the expropriation of the buyer’s cognitive
investment by the seller at the time of contract writing. By “hold up”, we will henceforth mean the post
contractual hold up by the seller.
12Because the ex ante and ex post bargaining powers have been assumed to be identical, this condition
is equivalent to the condition that the ex ante price splits the default (prior to renegotiation) surplus:
σ(v − c −  ρ(b∗)Δ) = p(b∗) − c.
The analogous (and equivalent) condition for the buyer is:
β[v − c −  ρ(b∗)a]=[ v −  ρ(b∗)(a + h)] − p(b∗).
9or
p(b
∗)=c + σ

v − c −  ρ(b
∗)Δ

.
The left-hand side of (1) is the share, accruing to the seller, of the total surplus as perceived
when bargaining over design A,t h a ti sv − c −  ρ(b∗)a. The right-hand side of (1) is the
seller’s proﬁt. Her opportunity cost is c−  ρ(b∗)h, since with conditional probability  ρ(b∗),
she will have the opportunity to hold the buyer up for an amount h. The price p(b∗)i s
such that the seller indeed obtains a fraction σ of the ex ante total surplus. The term
 ρ(b∗)h can be interpreted as a hold-up discount.13
If the buyer ﬁnds out that A  is appropriate, then he will rationally insist that the
contract specify the delivery of A  as he knows that under design A he will be held up
with probability 1: By disclosing A , the buyer receives fraction β of the gains from trade
i.e., β(v −c). By concealing design A ,s h eg e t sv −(a+h)−p(b∗), where as earlier p(b∗)
shares the gains from trade:
v −  ρ(b
∗)(a + h) − p(b
∗)=β(v − c −  ρ(b
∗)a).
Thus, disclosing A  increases the buyer’s utility by:
ΔUB = βa+( 1−  ρ(b
∗))σΔ > 0.
The ﬁrst term in ΔUB is a true eﬃciency gain (of which the buyer appropriates a fraction
β) while the second represents the unanticipated expropriation by the seller that the buyer
cannot charge for ex ante if he does not disclose design A .
Gross of cognitive costs, the payoﬀs for design A  are
β(v − c) for the buyer and σ(v − c) for the seller.
Finally, consider the buyer’s choice of cognitive eﬀort b. Assuming for the moment
that the buyer trades even when having learned nothing, the latter solves:
(2) max
{b}

− TB(b)+ρbβ(v − c)+ρ(1 − b)

v − a − h − p(b
∗)

+( 1− ρ)

v − p(b
∗)

13 The generalized Nash bargaining solution allows us to abstract from the issue of inferences that are
drawn by the seller in a sequential bargaining game when the buyer makes an oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path
price oﬀer.
Consider an alternating-move bargaining game delivering fraction (β,σ) of the surplus in a complete
information set-up. Then the solution p(b∗) still prevails under (potentially) asymmetric information as
long as the seller’s beliefs are passive (that is, the seller still believes that the buyer has chosen b = b∗
when the buyer makes an oﬀ-the-equilibrium path oﬀer).
By contrast, the other “natural” foundation for the generalized Nash bargaining solution (seller (buyer)
makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with probability σ(β)) requires some modiﬁcation to the analysis. Because
the buyer can refuse to trade when the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, then his payoﬀ function is
not smooth at b = b∗ in an hypothetical pure-strategy equilibrium. The analysis is then similar to that
of the case β ≤ β0 below. We opt for simplicity by making an assumption that guarantees the existence
of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
10⇐⇒ max
{b}

− TB(b)+β(v − c)+( 1− ρb) ρ(b
∗)σΔ − ρ(1 − b)(a + h)

.
To obtain (2), note that with probability ρb, the buyer proposes design A  and obtains
share β of the joint surplus v − c. With probability 1 − ρb, the two parties contract
on design A at price p(b∗). With probability ρ(1 − b), the appropriate design is not
identiﬁed and the buyer must bear the adjustment cost a augmented by the hold-up h.
Diﬀerentiating (2) (together the equilibrium condition b = b∗) yields ﬁrst-order condition:
(3) T
 
B(b
∗)=ρa + ρ[h −  ρ(b
∗)σΔ]
The LHS of (3) is the buyer’s marginal cost of cognition. His marginal beneﬁt, the RHS
of (3), is composed of three terms. The ﬁrst, ρa, is the social beneﬁt. The second ρh,i s
the buyer’s marginal beneﬁt of avoiding a hold-up. The third, −ρ ρ(b∗)σΔ, corresponds
to the reduction in the bargained price when specifying design A  rather than design A
(the bargained price for design A accounts for the possibility of hold-up and is therefore
lower than that for design A ).
Uniqueness of b∗ and comparative statics. Using the Bayesian updating condition,  ρ(b)=
ρ(1 − b)/(1 − ρb),
(4) T
 
B(b
∗)=ρa + ρ

h −
ρ(1 − b∗)
1 − ρb∗ σΔ

.
In particular, in the absence of adjustment cost (a = 0, i.e., h = σΔ), the equilibrium
level of eﬀort is given by
T
 
B(b
∗)=
ρ(1 − ρ)
1 − ρb∗ h.
Under Assumption 1 (and the fact that T  
B(0) = 0 and TB(1) = +∞), condition (4)
has a unique solution, which lies in (0,1). One can interpret Assumption 1 in terms of
an interesting strategic complementarity between the buyer’s cognitive choice, b,a n dt h e
seller’s anticipation thereof, b∗. A seller who anticipates a high level of cognition will
accept only a low hold-up discount for design A. In turn, a high price for design A makes
design A  relatively more attractive and therefore encourages the buyer to engage in more
cognition. Assumption 1 puts a bound on this strategic complementarity so as to ensure
uniqueness of the deterministic cognition equilibrium.
Condition (4) implies that b∗, and therefore the equilibrium transaction costs increase
with the adjustment cost a and with the utility loss Δ.14
Non-local deviations. To check that the cognitive intensity b∗ given by (4) is indeed an
equilibrium, we need to check that the buyer does not want to deviate and not trade when
14b∗ also increases with the seller’s bargaining power σ as long as the transaction costs exceed the
socially optimal level
	
b∗ >  b


; see below for the corresponding comparison.
11remaining unaware (the maximand in (2) implicitly assumes that trade always occurs).
This is indeed the case if b ≥ b∗ (as the buyer is then at least as conﬁdent as the seller about
the absence of hold-up opportunity) or for b a bit below b∗. But for b much lower than
b∗, the buyer puts much more weight than the seller on the design not being appropriate,
and a bargaining breakdown may occur at the ex ante stage.
Expression (2) indeed describes the buyer’s payoﬀ as long as the buyer’s expected
utility when contracting on A (i.e., when being unaware) is positive.15 Let b  denote the
buyer’s optimal cognitive intensity when planning not to write a contract when unaware:
b
  = argmax
{b}

− TB(b)+ρbβ(v − c)

.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for b∗ to be the equilibrium cognitive strategy is thus:
(5) β

v − c − ρ(1 − b
∗)a

− TB(b
∗) ≥ ρb
 β(v − c) − TB(b
 ),
where we make use of the fact that parties are symmetrically informed on the equilibrium
path and share the gains from trade v − c − ρ(1 − b∗)a in proportions (β,σ).
Appendix 1 shows that
(5) is satisﬁed if and only if β ≥ β0 for some β0 ∈ (0,1).
Are transaction costs too high or too low? The issue of whether the buyer’s informa-
tion acquisition is excessive or insuﬃcient is simply a question of the external eﬀect of
specifying A  on the seller. When the buyer speciﬁes A , the eﬀect on the seller is
ΔUS = σa− [1 −  ρ(b
∗)]σΔ.
T h eﬁ r s tt e r mi nΔ US is the share of the true eﬃciency gain borne by the seller. The
second term is (the negative of) the unanticipated expropriation by the seller. Condition
(3) can be rewritten as:
T
 
B(b
∗)=ρ(a − ΔUS).
15That is, v − p(b∗) −  ρ(b)(a + h) ≥ 0, or
β(v − c) ≥  ρ(b)(h + a) −  ρ(b∗)(h + σa).
Because  ρ(b) ≤ ρ, a suﬃcient condition for this condition to be satisﬁed for all b when a = 0 is that the
buyer’s bargaining power be suﬃciently large in relation to the relative hold-up stake:
β
1 − β
≥
ρΔ
v − c
.
12There is excessive cognition if and only if ΔUS < 0, or:
(6)
 1 − ρ
1 − ρb∗

Δ >a .
Fixing a, condition (6) is satisﬁed16 if and only if Δ ≥ Δ∗(a) for some Δ∗(a) ∈ [0,a).
Note that Δ∗(0) = 0: In the absence of adjustment cost, the contract is always too
complete. Conversely, (6) is violated and so the contract is too incomplete when there is
no gain to renegotiation (Δ ≡ a).
These results ﬁt with our earlier intuition. Cognition is socially excessive if it is
just meant to avoid hold-ups. By contrast, for large adjustment costs, which end up
being shared between the two parties, free riding is paramount and cognition is socially
suboptimal.
Does it pay to be bright/experienced? One may wonder whether brightness or experience
beneﬁts the contracting parties.17 Intelligence or experience with this type of contract
can be described in this framework as a reduction in the marginal cost of cognition,
TB(b;ν); that a higher ν corresponds to a higher intelligence or experience corresponds
to the condition ∂
	
T  
B(b;ν)


/∂ν < 0. Condition (4) implies that a brighter buyer is more
likely to ﬁnd out a contractual shortcoming (∂b∗/∂ν > 0). This implies that with positive
adjustment costs, a bright buyer is a more attractive trading partner for the seller (who
receives σ[v−c−ρ(1−b∗)a]). As for the buyer, condition (2) implies that being perceived
as stupid/inexperienced, by increasing the hold-up discount, beneﬁts the buyer. The ideal
situation for the buyer is therefore to be bright and not to be perceived so.
“Something’s ﬁshy”: Condition (4) may still hold even if A  is not necessarily the ﬁnal
design when A is not the appropriate one. Namely, suppose that when the buyer learns
A  ex ante, there is positive probability that the appropriate design is some A   rather
than A . As long as the buyer cannot further investigate whether A  or A   obtains, then
assuming there is no adjustment cost from A  to A  , condition (4) holds: The buyer under
design A  receives expected gross payoﬀ β(v − c) on and oﬀ the equilibrium path (i.e.,
for any b, and not only for b = b∗). Put diﬀerently, the important feature behind (4) is
that the identiﬁcation of A  creates symmetric information, not that it is the ﬁnal design
or that it eliminates ex post hold ups by the seller.
The methodology developed here also extends to a situation in which a modiﬁcation to
the standard design may trigger further cognition. To illustrate this point in the simplest
manner consider the following “stationary environment”: Let A0 ≡ A. If the buyer
learns about design Ak, then there is probability 1−ρ that this design is appropriate and
probability ρ that it is not. By exerting cognitive eﬀort TB(bk), the buyer discovers design
Ak+1 with probability ρbk (and can then continue his cognitive process). Suppose further
16Recall that b∗ is an increasing function of Δ and a.
17I am grateful to Joel Sobel for suggesting this question.
13that there is no adjustment cost (a = 0) so as to simplify expressions. One can search for
an equilibrium in which, conditional on knowing design Ak, (i) the buyer exerts cognitive
eﬀort bk ≡ b∗∗, (ii) if he does not discover anything wrong with Ak, he discloses it and
trades at price p, and (iii) the value function is stationary. Letting Vk denote the value
function:
Vk ≡ max
{bk}

− TB(bk)+ρbkVk+1 +( 1− ρ)(v − p)
+ ρ(1 − bk)(v − a − h − p)

,
Vk = V for all k, bk = b
∗∗ for all k,
and
p = c + σ[v − c −  ρ(b
∗∗)Δ].
After some manipulations, one obtains:
T
 
B(b
∗∗)=ρ

1 − ρ
1 − ρb∗∗h −
TB(b∗∗)
1 − ρb∗∗

as compared to
T
 
B(b
∗)=ρ

1 − ρ
1 − ρb∗h

.
The ﬁnal design has a higher probability of being inappropriate in the multi-stage cog-
nition problem: The buyer realizes that ﬁnding a fault with the candidate design will
not alleviate the endogenous adverse selection concern and will lead him to incur future
expected cognition cost TB(b∗∗)

1+ρb∗∗ +( ρb∗∗)2 + ···

= TB(b∗∗)/[1 − ρb∗∗].
Post-contractual cognition? Does the buyer ever have an incentive to look for problems
after the contact has been signed but before adjustment costs must be occurred (i.e., in
time to adjust the design without having to incur the adjustment cost)? The answer is
no. Intuitively, the hold-up by the seller can no longer be avoided once a contract has
been signed and so the incentives to engage in cognition are diminished. To show this
formally, let TB(b +  b) denote the cognition cost, with b and  b denoting the pre- and
post-contractual eﬀorts.18 To see that b = b∗ and  b = 0 is an equilibrium, note that
a post-contract identiﬁcation of design A  yields an extra βa to the buyer, and so the
marginal gain of cognition at  b =0i s
−T
 
B(b
∗)+ρβa ≤ 0
(with strict inequality if σ>0).
18One may have in mind that the buyer (rationally) investigates ﬁrst the most obvious/cheapest routes
to ﬁnd ﬂaws in the design, and then tries harder ones.
14(b) Randomized-cognition region
Conversely, if β<β 0, the buyer randomizes over his cognition choice. Furthermore,
the ex ante contract negotiation necessarily breaks down with strictly positive probability;
for, in the absence of breakdown, the equilibrium price for design A must be independent
of the value b chosen by the buyer (since the buyer prefers the lowest possible price
among those consistent with a deterministic agreement regardless of his cognitive choice).
Consequently, (2) and (4) must hold, a contradiction.
Appendix 2 provides an explicit solution when the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer (β = 0) and adjustments are costless (a = 0). The equilibrium involves the buyer
randomizing over some interval [0,¯ b] and the seller randomizing over the price interval
[v−ρΔ,v− ˆ ρ(¯ b)Δ] for design A (the seller charges v for design A ). The buyer has a zero
expected utility, as one would expect given that the seller has full bargaining power. The
lower bound b on the buyer’s cognitive intensity is necessarily equal to 0 since the seller
will never charge less than the willingness to pay, v−ˆ ρ(b)Δ, of the most pessimistic “type”
b. Thus the buyer’s utility is −TB(b), and so b = 0 for this utility to be non-negative.
To illustrate this randomization in a simpler manner, let us restrict the analysis to the
case of two feasible levels of cognition:
Two levels of cognition. Suppose that β = a = 0 and that the buyer chooses between
cognition levels 0 (at no cost) and b (at cost TB: we omit the argument for notational
simplicity). Let ρ and ˆ ρ<ρdenote the corresponding posteriors, and p0 ≡ v − ρΔa n d
pb ≡ v − ˆ ρΔ the buyer’s associated willingnesses to pay for design A.
Let the buyer choose cognition level 0 (respectively b) with probability g (respectively
1−g). Given that it is suboptimal for the seller to charge prices diﬀering from p0 and pb,
let the seller charge p0 (respectively pb) with probability f (respectively 1 − f).
To make things interesting, assume that
(1 − ρb)(ρ − ˆ ρ)Δ >T B.
This condition ensures that the deterministic choice of no cognition is not an equilibrium;19
for, if it were, then f = 1 and by deviating to cognition level b, the buyer would receive20
(1 − ρb)(v − p0 − ˆ ρΔ) − TB =( 1− ρb)(ρ − ˆ ρ)Δ − TB > 0.
The buyer cannot choose cognition level b for sure either, since if he did the seller would
charge pb for sure (f = 0) and so the buyer’s utility would be equal to −TB < 0. In
19In the continuous-cognition analysis of Appendix B, this is ensured by the assumption that T 
B(0) = 0.
20The buyer is charged v and has a zero gross utility when bargaining over design A . Yet the buyer
prefers to disclose design A  when aware of it since he receives a negative utility of design A even for the
lower price p0:
v − p0 − Δ=−(1 − ρ)Δ < 0.
15equilibrium therefore, the buyer must play a mixed strategy and be indiﬀerent between
the two cognitive choices:
f(1 − ρb)(ρ − ˆ ρ)Δ − TB =0 .
Similarly, the seller must be indiﬀerent between p0 and pb:21
p0 − c +
gρ+( 1− g)(1 − ρb)ˆ ρ
g +( 1− g)(1 − ρb)
Δ=
(1 − g)(1 − ρb)
g +( 1− g)(1 − ρb)
[pb − c +ˆ ρΔ],
or, after some manipulations:22
g
1 − g
=( 1− ρb)
(ρ − ˆ ρ)Δ
v − c
.
Note that when the gains from trade, v − c, increase, the seller’s pricing behavior (f)
remains unchanged (the prices p0 and pb increase with v, of course). By contrast, the
buyer exerts more cognition (g decreases); otherwise the seller would be too eager to
guarantee a sure agreement, i.e. to charge the lower price p0.
(c) Summary
Proposition 1. (one-sided cognition)
(i) When β ≥ β0, the buyer incurs cognitive cost TB(b∗) where b∗ is given by
T
 
B(b
∗)=ρa + ρ[h −  ρ(b
∗)σΔ].
The buyer’s cognitive cost increases with the severity of the hold-up problem (increases
with Δ) and with the adjustment cost a.
The buyer fully bears the deadweight loss associated with cognition and has utility
β[v − c − ρ(1 − b∗)a] − TB(b∗), while the seller has utility σ[v − c − ρ(1 − b∗)a].
The contract is too complete (there is too much cognition, i.e., b∗ >  b) if and only if
 1 − ρ
1 − ρb∗

Δ >a .
(ii) When β<β 0, contract negotiations break down with positive probability.
21Note that the probability of “type” 0 conditional on design A is higher than g and is equal to
g/[g +( 1− g)(1 − ρb)].
22To interpret this condition, rewrite it as:
g(v − c)=

(1 − g)(1 − ρb)

(ρ −  ρ)Δ.
The LHS is the expected loss of charging pb rather than p0 (with probability g the buyer chooses no
cognition and would have accepted p0, yielding surplus v−c to the seller). The RHS is the expected gain
associated with rent extraction when the buyer engages in cognition b.
16B Two-sided cognition
Suppose that the seller’s cognition is no longer “prohibitively” expensive. The seller can
learn about design A  (when relevant) with probability s at cost TS(s). We look for
conditions under which the one-sided cognition equilibrium (b = b∗, s = 0) is also a two-
sided cognition equilibrium. To this purpose, we investigate two questions: First, does
the seller have an incentive to disclose the existence of design A  when she becomes aware
of it? Second, does the seller refuse to trade when not learning about a potential hold-up?
If the answers to these two questions are both negative, then the seller gains nothing from
becoming informed and, a fortiori, does not want to incur costs to become informed.23
Disclosure of design A . Suppose that the buyer selects b∗. If the buyer ﬁnds out that the
design should be A , then any cognitive eﬀort by the seller is wasted. Suppose therefore
that the seller, but not the buyer, becomes aware that design A  is the appropriate one.
The seller obtains
σ(v − c)
by revealing A . By concealing A , she obtains instead:
p(b
∗) − c + h = σ(v − c)+[ h −  ρ(b
∗)σΔ].
Concealing design A  therefore dominates disclosure if and only if
h ≥  ρ(b
∗)σΔ ⇐⇒ Δ − a ≥  ρ(b
∗)Δ.
This is nothing but the condition (condition (6)) under which transaction costs are too
high. Put diﬀerently, the excessive incentive for the buyer to engage in cognition is linked
to the seller’s incentive not to disclose. This is natural: Excessive buyer cognition arises
when the disclosure of A  by the buyer hurts the seller, and therefore also corresponds to
the condition under which the seller does not want to disclose design A  herself. The seller
does not disclose if the hold-up beneﬁt h that she will enjoy ex post by not disclosing
exceeds the hold-up discount,  ρ(b∗)σΔ, on the bargained price under design A; similarly,
the buyer has excessive incentives to invest in cognition if the seller’s hold-up beneﬁt
exceeds the ex ante price reduction associated with design A .
Incentive for not trading. If the seller does not beneﬁt from disclosing design A ,t h eo n l y
potential incentive for the seller to invest in cognition is to avoid trade when she does
not discover an opportunity for a hold-up. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which
only the seller does not disclose when learning design A  and trades even if unaware of a
hold-up opportunity. The price is then p(b∗) for design A.I fp(b∗) ≥ c,o r
(7) v − c ≥  ρ(b
∗)Δ,
however, the seller always wants to trade even if sure that design A is appropriate.
23This holds regardless of the degree of correlation between the two cognitive activities.
17Proposition 2. (two-sided cognition.) The one-sided cognition equilibrium for β ≥ β0
is also a two-sided-cognition equilibrium (b = b∗, s =0 ) provided that:
(i) contracts are too complete in the one-sided cognition equilibrium:
(8) Δ − a ≥  ρ(b
∗)Δ,
and
(9)(ii) v − c ≥  ρ(b
∗)Δ.
Proposition 2 captures a basic asymmetry between the buyer’s and the seller’s gains
from learning about an opportunity to hold up the seller. The buyer gains from being
informed about the probability of a hold-up as this enables him to avoid it. By contrast,
when aware of an opportunity for a hold-up, the seller may not want to disclose it; her
only potential use of this information is then to refuse to trade when she is pessimistic
about the possibility of an additional income ex post. If the scope for hold-up is however
limited (note that a suﬃcient condition for (9) to be satisﬁed is that v −c ≥ ρΔ), then it
is not worth forgoing gains from trade in order to economize on the hold-up discount.24
When does the seller engage in cognitive eﬀort?
While Proposition 2 captures a fundamental asymmetry in the incentives to engage
in cognition about the potential for hold up by the seller, more generally the seller may
exert cognitive eﬀort for one of three reasons:
(1) Severe hold-up discount. First, if the hold-up discount ( ρ(b∗)σΔ) is large (either (8)
or (9) fails), the seller may want to learn about the inappropriateness of design A,e i t h e r
to avoid the adjustment cost or to not trade when unaware of a hold-up opportunity.
(2) Good news for the buyer. We have so far assumed that cognition may unveil bad
news (a hold-up opportunity) for the buyer. We could more symmetrically assume that
cognition may also unveil good news for the buyer (some unexpected beneﬁt delivered
by the seller’s technology). We then have a natural specialization principle: The buyer
24Condition (9) is stronger than needed for the property that the seller does not incur any cognitive cost.
For example, suppose that (i) the seller chooses cognitive cost TS(s) after being oﬀered to negotiate on
design A (so the seller knows that the buyer is unaware of an alternative design) and (ii) the probabilities
of discovering A  if appropriate are independent for the buyer and the seller. Then the seller exerts no
cognitive eﬀort when bargaining over A if
σ(v − c) ≥ max
{s}

 ρ(b∗)s

p(b∗)+h − c

− TS(s)

.
In the extreme case of free cognition (TS ≡ 0a n ds os = 1), this condition boils down to
v − c ≥  ρ(b∗)Δ,
that is to (9); but it is in general weaker than (9).
18exerts cognitive eﬀort in order to identify potential hold-ups while the seller tries to push
the price up by ﬁnding reasons why her technology delivers value to the buyer.
(3) Bad news for the seller. The seller may attempt to learn about bad news for herself.
Indeed, consider the more symmetric model with three states of nature. With probability
ρ, the appropriate design is A , which delivers v at cost c, while A delivers v − Δa tt h e
same cost. With probability μ, the appropriate design is A  , which delivers v at cost c,
while A delivers v at cost c + Δ for the seller. For example, contract A fails to identify a
loophole in a non-compete clause; due to Bertrand competition in an adjacent market, this
loophole brings little or no revenue to the buyer, but costs Δ to the seller. Alternatively,
design or contract A may fail to specify some marketing, technological or standardization
eﬀort by the buyer, costing Δ to the seller. When the appropriate design is A  or A  , but
the initial contract speciﬁes A, adjustment cost a ∈ [0,Δ) needs to be incurred (by the
party who does not lose Δ) to move to the appropriate design.
Finally, with probability 1 − ρ − μ, A is the appropriate design and delivers value v
at cost c.
Suppose that the two parties have a comparative advantage in investigating their own
payoﬀ, i.e., here in searching for bad news for themselves: the buyer can learn design A  (if
relevant) with probability b at cost TB(b), and the seller can learn design A   (if relevant)
with probability z at cost TS(z). The symmetry of the situation suggests that the seller
indeed engages in cognition so as to identify bad news for herself. Appendix 3 checks that
this is indeed the case and provides the equilibrium conditions for the cognitive eﬀorts.
III. Robustness
A Does competition reduce transaction costs?
This section provides some preliminary insights on the impact of ex ante competition
among sellers. The bargaining weights β and σ (and relatedly the hold-up stake h)
now refer exclusively to the ex post bargaining strengths. For the sake of simplicity and
unless otherwise speciﬁed, we assume one-sided cognition and no adjustment cost. We
generalize the analysis of section II.A to the case of Bertrand competition among (at least
two) sellers.
Competition for design A  yields price equal to cost (c) and buyer gross surplus v −c.
Suppose next that the proposed design is A and that the equilibrium level of cognition is
b∗ (as it turns out, this level will be the same as in section II.A, so we do not introduce
new notation). The competitive price is then
p = c −  ρ(b
∗)h.
Underpricing (low-ball bidding) thus reﬂects a hold-up discount.
19And so the buyer solves
max
{b}

− TB(b)+ρb(v − c)+ρ(1 − b)

v − c −

1 −  ρ(b
∗)

h

+( 1− ρ)

v − c +  ρ(b
∗)h

,
or, letting H(b,b∗) ≡

(1 − ρ) ρ(b∗) − ρ(1 − b)

1 −  ρ(b∗)

h,
max
{b}

− TB(b)+( v − c)+H(b,b
∗)

.
By contrast, under bilateral monopoly (section II.A), the buyer solved:
max
{b}

− TB(b)+β(v − c)+H(b,b
∗)

.
Thus competition allows the buyer to appropriate an extra σ(v −c) (the seller’s share
of the total gross surplus), but does not impact his incentive to exert cognition.
Next consider the buyer’s option not to contract on design A. The buyer then solves:
max
{b}

− TB(b)+ρb(v − c)

.
By comparison, under bilateral ex ante monopoly, he solved:
max
{b}

− TB(b)+ρbβ(v − c)

.
This analysis yields:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and ex-ante seller competition, there exists
βc
0 <β 0 such that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if β ≥ βc
0. The cognitive
intensity b∗ is then the same as under ex ante bilateral monopoly.
Proposition 3 shows that competition in general does not reduce the buyer’s transac-
tion costs. Intuitively, the buyer is worried about the occurrence of an ex post hold-up,
and this concern is the same regardless of the extent of ex ante competition.
By contrast, Proposition 2 suggests why the analysis of two-sided cognition (section
II.B) must be amended. We saw that in an ex-ante bilateral-monopoly situation, the
seller may not want to sink cognitive eﬀort because she may enjoy a positive surplus
even when she is unaware of hold-up opportunity. Ex ante competition destroys this
surplus. Indeed the seller loses  ρ(b∗)h in the absence of hold-up. Thus, provided that
T  
S(0) = 0, the sellers sink cognitive eﬀort. The situation then resembles one of common
values, with positive aﬃliation among sellers, and negative aﬃliation between the sellers
and the buyer. Interestingly, the winner’s curse faced by the sellers depends not only on
the auction’s design, but also on the other sellers’ and the buyer’s cognitive investments.
And the buyer might try to limit sellers’ access to information in order to avoid costly
rent seeking. We leave the fascinating topic of auction design with transaction costs for
future research.
20B Mechanisms to modify ex post bargaining power
We have focused on contracts that specify a design and a price. However, the fact that
other designs (in the current model, A ) are not initially describable may not prevent
parties from writing contracts that elicit these designs when they later enter the parties’
awareness; what can be achieved then depends on the speciﬁcation of the stochastic struc-
ture for von Neumann-Morgenstern payoﬀ functions.25 On the other hand, the robustness
of the cognitive rent-seeking point and the implications derived in this paper hinge only
on the buyer’s concern about being held up because of a faulty contract design. Even if
one were able to control through a contract the sharing pattern for the gain of adjustment
from design A to design A , it is in general unwise to not let the seller receive any beneﬁt
from this adjustment. Let us give three reasons for this:
Finding ex post solutions. Suppose that restoring design A ’s utility under faulty design
A requires ex post innovativeness by the seller and the buyer. Ex post sharing of the gain
from trade then determines the ex post incentives to ﬁnd solutions. Any mechanism is
characterized by the shares  β and  σ of the gains from trade Δ−a realized when a design
is adjusted with gain Δ for the buyer and cost a to the seller.26 Because  β+ σ =1 ,i tm a y
not be feasible to make both parties choose eﬃcient levels of cognition and the proper ex
post eﬀort to ﬁnd a solution.
Even under one-sided cognition, discouraging cognitive investments will generally en-
tail other costs. Consider for example the buyer’s cognitive investment. From (4), b∗
increases with  σ and reducing excess cognition requires lowering  σ. It is easy to think of
reasons why the seller must receive a minimum fraction of the surplus when the design is
adjusted. Let us depict two such set-ups.
Degradation. In the ﬁrst, when A is the right design, the buyer can degrade it, thereby
appropriating some private beneﬁt ξ and creating a cost d to the seller (for example the
buyer may fail to invest in the technology, and thereby to generate spillovers for the
seller); the value of A to the buyer is then only v − Δ. Assume a cost a ∈ (ξ,Δ) of
adjusting it back, to a design that is payoﬀ equivalent to A; then the states of nature in
which A must be adjusted to A  because of degradation and because A was inappropriate
to start with are indistinguishable from a von Neumann-Morgenstern perspective, and so
any mechanism must deliver the same surpluses to the buyer and the seller. To avoid a
degradation (which is undesirable if a+d>ξ ), the share of the ex post surplus,  σ(Δ−a),
received by the seller in case of renegotiation must be suﬃciently large. This puts a lower
bound on the seller’s hold-up, and therefore on the buyer’s incentive to engage in cognitive
rent-seeking.
25On this, see Maskin and Tirole (1999b).
26As in Maskin and Moore (1999) and Segal and Whinston (2002), we rule out third parties (“budget
breakers”). Recall also that we are in a risk-neutral world, which further limits what can be implemented
(see Maskin and Tirole 1999b).
21Seller investment. Another standard reason why the seller must get some ex post surplus
is that some speciﬁc investment by the seller must be encouraged. Suppose for example
costless adjustments (a = 0) and that, conditional on A being the appropriate design,
a post-contractual investment by the seller raises the buyer’s utility by Δ after some
adjustment. Again assume that the adjustments from A to A , whether justiﬁed by an
inappropriate initial design or by seller investment, are payoﬀ-equivalent (they raise the
buyer’s utility by Δ). Encouraging speciﬁc investment by the seller requires providing her
with enough surplus from adjustments, thus creating incentives for the buyer to invest in
cognition.
Appendix 4 goes into the analysis of this section more formally and shows that even
in the most favorable case, in which ex post bargaining powers can be ﬁne tuned through
an initial contract, the possibility of cognitive rent seeking remains.
IV. Determinants of contract incompleteness and
reverse causality
This section draws some implications of the model to highlight the two-way relationship
between reputational concerns, control rights and speciﬁc investments on the one hand,
and contract incompleteness on the other.
Relational contracting and incompleteness
The literature has emphasized that ﬁrms will search for repeated relationships when
contracts are (for an exogenous reason) incomplete. Following Macaulay (1963), who
argued that a key virtue of relational contracting is that parties can count on each other
to abide by the spirit of the contract, and can therefore economize on the cost of specifying
its letter, I point out that causality runs in both directions.
A dynamic model of relationship contracting can be found in Tirole (2007). The jest
of the analysis can be apprehended in reduced form as follows: Suppose that, when faced
with the opportunity to hold up the buyer, the seller exploits it only with probability
x. With probability 1 − x, the seller abides by the spirit of the contract rather than by
its letter27 and makes the adjustment at cost (a). In a full-ﬂedged reputation model, x
27As Macaulay (1963) noted long ago:
“There is a hesitancy to speak of legal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations.”
This view is based on interviews with businessmen and lawyers. Representative narratives are:
“If something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the problem.
You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again.
One doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must behave decently. ”
and
“You can settle any dispute if you keep the lawyers and accountants out of it. They just do
not understand the give-and-take needed in business.”
22decreases with the sellers’ patience and increases with the fraction of a priori opportunistic
sellers.
The generalization of condition (4) is then:
T
 
B(b
∗(x)) = ρa + ρ[xh − σ ρ(b
∗(x))a].
For example, in the absence of adjustment cost (a = 0) and when opportunistic sellers
always pool with honest ones (x =0 ) ,b∗(0) = 0: The buyer need not engage in cognition
as he knows that he can rely on the seller to behave fairly (in the spirit of the contract)
ex post.
Contract length and vertical integration
Suppose now that the parties choose between contracting the “basic mode” (on A
or A ) as described above or an “alternative contracting mode”; in order to encompass
several applications, let us leave this alternative mode abstract and just assume that: (a)
it generates an extra cost K, and (b) it does not leave scope for hold ups. For simplicity,
there is no adjustment cost (a =0 )a n dβ is suﬃciently large for the pure-strategy
equilibrium to exist in Proposition 1 (β ≥ β0). The buyer will not opt for the alternative
mode if
β(v − c) − TB(b
∗) ≥ β(v − c − K)
or
(10) βK ≥ TB(b
∗).
Note that the buyer then exerts a positive externality on the seller who receives σ(v − c)
on average rather than σ(v − c − K).
If (10) is violated however, then the alternative contracting mode must be chosen
with positive probability.28 The analysis is then similar to the analysis of mixed-strategy
equilibria in Section II.A.
Let us give two applications of this idea:
(a) Delays and contract length. The “alternative contracting mode” could refer to con-
tracting and incurring the cost c of manufacturing the design tomorrow rather than today.
This makes the project less attractive (for example the buyer’s utility is v−K as opposed
to v if things get started today),29 but has the beneﬁt that the relevant design (A or A 
will be costlessly learned by both parties, economizing on transaction costs.
This very stylized model oﬀers a metaphor for the tradeoﬀ involved in writing detailed
long-term contracts: Filling out the details early on before the uncertainty resolves itself
28But not with probability 1. Otherwise b = 0 and the two parties are better oﬀ contracting on A,
with probability ρ of a hold up.
29See also Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2007).
23gives rise to transaction and adverse selection costs. A slightly more sophisticated version
of the same idea can be found in Tirole (2007), in which K stands for the cost of not
protecting another investment through a long-term contract rather than for a cost of
delaying the start of a project. For example, there could be two periods 1 and 2 (at
which the uncertainty about the design resolves exogenously). Delivery occurs at date
2 regardless of the choice of contract. The “basic mode” involves contracting at date
1o nA or A . The “alternative mode” consists in waiting and signing a spot contract
at date 2. This interpretation ﬁts for example with Paul L. Joskow (1987)’s empirical
evidence on coal contracts, which shows that such contracts are much shorter when ex
post competition makes the prospect of hold-up more remote.30
(b) Ownership. The endogeneity of the extent of completeness provides a rationale for
the conventional wisdom that vertical integration economizes on contracting costs, i.e.,
that a key beneﬁt of ﬁrms is that they allow less explicit contractual speciﬁcations.31
Suppose that the buyer ex post can“ﬁx” (costlessly modify by himself) a wrong design
A, provided that he acquires ownership of the seller’s technology and not only of the seller’s
good.32 Such “buyer ownership”33 thus prevent ex post hold-ups.
The transfer of the seller’s technology to the buyer however creates a deadweight
loss. The literature has analyzed a number of reasons for why it may be so, and we will
therefore not be interested in formalizing a particular cost; for example the transfer may
create competition in the R&D or some downstream product market, generating cost K.
Alternatively, transferring the bargaining power through ownership may involve the costs
30The relationship between transaction costs, incompleteness and contract length is illustrated for ex-
ample by the contrast between traditional procurement contracts and public-private partnerships (PPPs)
in which the conception and construction stage is bundled with longer-term operations and maintenance.
PPPs (Private Finance Initiative, PFI, deals in the U.K.) are known to be prone to both contractual
incompleteness and high transaction costs (V¨ alil¨ a 2005). The UK National Audit Oﬃce (2003) argues
that “Private Finance Initiative deals remain very costly to negotiate and these costs need to be factored
into the assessment.” For example, the mere cost of negotiations for the London Underground deal was
£180 million (and this number excludes bidders’ transaction costs); the average cost of National Health
Service PFI deals for external advisors only is about 3.7 percent of the capital value of the projects.
31For example, Klein (2002) argues:
“If [the pioneering Grossman and Hart model of integration] has the advantage of taking
the incompleteness of contracts seriously, it does not consider the key aspect of the contrac-
tual arrangement we identify with the ﬁrm, namely that it involves less explicit contractual
speciﬁcation and more ﬂexibility.”
Note, though, that in recent interesting work, Hart and Moore (2008) do endogenize the degree of
contractual incompleteness by introducing the behavioral feature of feelings of entitlement that make
economic agents want to shade on performance when they feel shortchanged.
32This is one of many ways of apprehending the transfer of a control right from the seller to the
buyer. For example, a transferable control model ` a la Aghion and Dewatripont and Rey (2004) could
alternatively be envisioned.
33“Buyer ownership” may not be exclusive. For example, the seller may have granted a block license
for her entire intellectual property, and still be able to use the intellectual property herself.
24discussed in section III.B
This idea is consistent with, and provides a potential rationale for available empirical
evidence. Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2006) documents that local governments
tend to provide public services in-house when contracting on these services is complex.
To the extent that transaction costs increase with the complexity, it is natural that local
governments use vertical integration to economize on them for highly complex or unknown
operations.
Sharon Novak and Scott Stern (2006) investigates the relationship between make-or-
buy choice and quality improvements over the life cycle in the automobile industry. That
paper shows that quality increases over time for in-house components and remains roughly
constant for outsourced components. My analysis provides one possible rationale for this
observation. Flaws in design (the inappropriateness of A in our model) are unveiled and
corrected only over time; thus the “adjustment cost” refers not only to the technical cost,
but also to the buyer’s lost time incurred in producing a lower-quality output.34 Because
the probability of adjustment, ρ(1 − b), is higher under vertical integration than under
outsourcing, quality improvements are therefore more likely under vertical integration.35
V. Alleys for future research
The introduction listed the main insights. Rather than restating them, let us conclude
with a couple of alleys for research.
The paper has stressed pre-contractual transaction costs. Similar techniques could
be used to give content to transaction costs that are incurred at the implementation
stage. For example, while in Maskin and Tirole (1999b) actions and contingencies may be
undescribable at the contracting stage, they are costlessly describable ex post. Thinking
through alternatives ex post however involves transaction costs that are similar to those
formalized here. It is certainly worth considering such ex post transaction costs.
Second, while the paper has stressed that a specialization in the cognitive investiga-
tions is natural, interesting patterns of strategic complementarities/substitutabilities may
emerge. This would arise in particular if both parties’ “thinking deeply enough about the
issues” were needed for the realization of gains from trade.
Third, the standard designs (A) and the cognitive cost functions (Ti) are inﬂuenced
by past contractual experimentation within and outside the industry. Familiarity with
34To formalize this idea in the context of this paper’s model, one can assume that the buyer’s value is
v − Δ for some time after the product is introduced and v once the seller has adjusted the design.
35An alternative explanation, noted by Novak and Stern, builds on Patrick Bajari and Tadelis (2001),
which shows that adjustments are less likely to be made under high-powered incentive schemes (out-
sourcing here). The idea in Bajari and Tadelis is that accounting structures are permanently diﬀerent
under vertical integration and separation, and that ﬁxed prices contracts are fraught with asymmetric
information ex post, and therefore harder to renegotiate.
25designs and their implications are path-dependent. The dynamics of contractual incom-
pleteness and heterogeneity across relationships is a fascinating topic for research.
Fourth, this line of thought may have implications for the separation of tasks of de-
signing and building.36 An architect or designer may be rewarded for getting the design
right at the outset. An integrated designer-builder may economize on costs, but may
require a strong reputation mechanism, akin to that envisioned in section IV..
Finally, we have assumed that the contract designers are residual claimants. In prac-
tice, they often are agents for their respective organizations. Their incentives to sink
transaction costs (opportunity cost of their time, legal and consulting fees, etc.) depend
on the design of their incentive package and on the internal monitoring set up. As ob-
served to Macaulay (1963), managers are usually tempted to write incomplete contracts
and count on relational contracting to discipline their counterpart. Their hierarchy and
legal councils by contrast are advocates of more rigor and try to avoid the oﬀ-balance
sheet liabilities associated with adjustment costs and hold-ups. Put diﬀerently, the extent
of contract incompleteness depends on the ﬁrms’ internal organizations.
36I’m grateful to a referee for this suggestion.
26Appendix A: Existence of a cut-oﬀ β0
Note, ﬁrst, that for β = 1 and for any a, the buyer is better oﬀ always trading:
max
{b}

− TB(b)+( v − c) − ρ(1 − b)a

> max
{b}

− TB(b)+ρb(v − c)

=m a x
{b}

− TB(b)+v − c − (1 − ρb)(v − c)

,
where we make use of the assumption that there are gains from trade even in the absence
of cognition (v − c − ρa > 0). Note also that for β = 0, the LHS of (5) is equal to
−TB(b∗) < 0 and the RHS to 0.
Let
U
T(β) ≡− TB
	
b
∗(β)


+ ρb
∗(β)β(v − c)
+

1 − ρb
∗(β)

β

v − c −  ρ
	
b
∗(β)


a

and
U
NT(β) ≡− TB
	
b
 (β)


+ ρb
 (β)β(v − c).
Consider a β such that the buyer wants to contract on design A when the seller expects
b∗(β) and furthermore:
U
T(β)=U
NT(β).
It must be the case that when choosing b (β) and the seller still expects b∗(β), the buyer
does not want to contract on design A. Furthermore, for the buyer not to be willing to
trade at price p
	
b∗(β)


, it must be the case that
b
 (β) <b
∗(β).
And so:
dUT
dβ
= v − c − ρ(1 − b
∗)a +( 1− ρb
∗)
d ρ
db∗
∂b∗
∂β
σΔ
>v− c − ρ(1 − b
∗)a
>ρ b
 (v − c)=
dUNT
dβ
.
This establishes the existence of a unique cut-oﬀ β0.
27Appendix B: Contract negotiation breakdown when
the seller has full bargaining power
When the seller has full bargaining power, the buyer receives no surplus when unveiling
design A . The buyer’s incentive to acquire information must then stem from a post-
information-acquisition rent that he receives when having acquired information and being
rather conﬁdent that there will be no hold-up. But such a rent can exist only if the
seller is uncertain about how much information was acquired. Moreover, the lowest b
on the equilibrium support must be equal to 0 since no rent can accrue to this “type”.
The lowest possible oﬀer for design A is therefore p = v − ρΔ. Consider the following
candidate mixed-strategy equilibrium:
 the seller’s oﬀer p follows cumulative distribution F(p)o n[ v − ρΔ,p],
 the buyer’s cognitive eﬀort b follows cumulative distribution G(b)o n[ 0 ,b].
The seller will never charge a price for design A that is refused with probability 1, and
so ¯ p = v − ˆ ρ(¯ b)Δ, since “type” ¯ b is the type most optimistic about the absence of hold
up.
When exerting cognitive eﬀort b, the buyer accepts all oﬀers satisfying v−p− ρ(b)Δ ≥ 0
and rejects others. His utility is then:
U(b)=−TB(b)+( 1− ρb)
 v− ρ(b)Δ
v−ρΔ

v − p −  ρ(b)Δ

dF(p)
≡− TB(b)+( 1− ρb)R(b).
Note that U(0) = 0. For the buyer to play a mixed strategy, it must be the case that
U(b)=0o n[ 0 ,b]; or
−T
 
B(b) − ρR(b) − (1 − ρb)
d ρ
db
ΔF
	
v −  ρ(b)Δ


=0 .
Using
d ρ
db
≡−
ρ(1 − ρ)
(1 − ρb)2, and letting B(p), an increasing function, be deﬁned by
p ≡ v −  ρ(B(p))Δ,
and
K(b)=T
 
B(b)(1 − ρb)+TB(b)ρ
(with K  > 0a n dK(0) = 0),
(A.1) F(p)=
K(B(p))
ρ(1 − ρ)Δ
.
28Using F(¯ p) = 1, the upper bound of the support, b,i sg i v e nb y
(A.2) [1 − ρb]T
 
B(b)+ρTB(b)=ρ(1 − ρ)Δ.
Note that b<b ∗. We must further show that U (b) ≤ 0 for b ≥ b.F o rs u c hv a l u e s ,t h e
buyer always trades, at average price pe = E[p]. Because for b>b
U(b)=−TB(b)+( 1− ρb)[v − p
e −  ρ(b)Δ],
U
 (b)=−T
 
B(b) − ρ[v − p
e]+ρ = −T
 
B(b)+T
 
B(b) < 0.
Let us now turn to the determination of G(b). Let π(p) denote the seller’s expected
proﬁt, conditional on design A:
H0π(p)=
 b
 ρ−1	v−p
Δ



p − c +  ρ(b)Δ

(1 − ρb)dG(b)
where H0 ≡
 b
0
(1 − ρb)dG(b) is the probability of design A.
This can be rewritten as a function of the cut-oﬀ
 b ≡  ρ
−1	v − p
Δ


:
H0π( b)=
 b
 b

v − c −

 ρ( b) −  ρ(b)

Δ

(1 − ρb)dG(b).
For π to be constant on [0,b], it must be the case that:
(A.3) −
d ρ
d b
Δ
 b
 b
(1 − ρb)dG(b)

− (v − c)(1 − ρ b)g( b)=0 .
Let H( b) ≡
 b
 b
(1 − ρb)dG(b), and x ≡
(1−ρ)Δ
v−c
The distribution G admits an atom at b = b.L e ty denote this atom. Then
H0 =( 1− ρb)y +
 b
−
0
(1 − ρb)g(b)db =( 1− ρb)y + x
 b
−
0
ρ
(1 − ρb)2H(b)db,
or
(A.4) H0 =( 1− ρb)y + x
 y
1 − ρb
− H0 +1− y

29Furthermore:
(A.5) ln
H0
H(b)
= x
 1
1 − ρ˜ b
− 1

yielding in particular (for ˜ b converging to b):
(A.6) ln
H0
y
= x
 1
1 − ρb
− 1

.
We thus obtain two equations (A4 and A6) with two unknowns (H0 and y), yielding
thereafter H(˜ b) from (A5)) and then g(˜ b) (from (A3)). Like in the two-cognition-level
case studied in the text, the distribution of “net prices” p−v is independent of the gains
from trade parameters v and c. By contrast, gains from trade v−c aﬀect the distribution
G of cognition levels through the parameter x.
Appendix C: Symmetric hold-up
Let
h ≡ σ(Δ − a)a n dk ≡ β(Δ − a)
denote the hold-up stakes,
θB(b,z) ≡
ρ(1 − b)
ρ(1 − b)+μ(1 − z)+( 1− ρ − μ)
,
θS(b,z) ≡
μ(1 − z)
ρ(1 − b)+μ(1 − z)+( 1− ρ − μ)
,
denote the posterior probabilities and
θ(b,z) ≡ θB(b,z)+θS(b,z).
In a pure-strategy equilibrium (b∗,z∗), the transaction price p = p(b∗,z∗) for design A
is given by:
(A.7) β

v − c − θ(b
∗,z
∗)a

= v − c − θB(b
∗,z
∗)[a + h]+θS(b
∗,z
∗)k.
and the transaction costs by:
T
 
B(b
∗)=ρ

a + h − θBσΔ+λSβΔ

= ρ
	
1 − θBσ + θSβ


a +
	
1 − θB


h + θSk

(A.8)
and
(A.9) T
 
S(z
∗)=μ
	
1 − θSβ + θBσ


a +
	
1 − θS


k + θBh

.
30Appendix D: Formal analysis of section III.B
This appendix makes the heuristic analysis of section III.B more formal.
Degradation. Section III.B argued that if the buyer can degrade the good delivered to
him and later renegotiate to restore its full value, preventing degradation requires that
the seller must get “enough” of the gains from renegotiation, thus inducing the buyer to
engage in (possibly excessive) cognition.
Consider four ex post states of nature:
ω1: the initial design A is appropriate and delivers the full utility v;
ω2:d e s i g n A is appropriate, but yields only v−Δ as the buyer has degraded it and thereby
enjoyed private beneﬁt ξ. The seller can at adjustment cost a restore the value to v;
ω3:d e s i g nA  is appropriate, but this was not identiﬁed ex ante. The seller can at adjust-
ment cost a raise value from v − Δt ov;
ω4: the appropriate design A  was contracted for ex ante and yields value v.
State ω3 has probability ρ(1−b), state ω4 probability ρb, state ω1 probability 1−ρ in
the absence of degradation and 0 in case of degradation. Let UB(ω) denote the buyer’s ex
post utility in state ω (the ex post utility is the utility obtained when the initial contract is
implemented and perhaps renegotiated; it includes transfers, but does not include (sunk)
cognition costs and beneﬁt from degradation).
What can be implemented in state of nature ω in general depends on the descrip-
tion of feasible actions and payoﬀs in that state of nature. We will just assume that the
states of nature ω2 and ω3 are identical in terms of von Neuman-Morgenstern (VNM)
utility functions. We now show that even if the contract can ex post induce any levels
of utility UB(ωi) it wants (but necessarily satisfying UB(ω2)=UB(ω3)), controlling cogni-
tion is inconsistent with preventing degradation (inducing seller investment in the second
illustration).
Note that for any mechanism that does not induce degradation:
UB(ω1) ≥ UB(ω2)+ξ
(the buyer must be willing not to degrade design A when learning that it is appropriate),
UB(ω4)=β(v − c)
(negotiation under symmetric awareness of A ),
UB(ω2)=UB(ω3)
31(ex post VNM payoﬀs are the same in states ω2 and ω3, even though these states have
diﬀerent origins),
UB(ω4) − UB(ω3)=
T  
B(b)
ρ
(buyer’s incentive compatible cognition), and

1 −  ρ(b)

UB(ω1)+ ρ(b)UB(ω3)=β

v − c −  ρ(b)a

(ex ante bargaining over design A).
Combining these conditions, implementable levels of cognition consistent with the
absence of degradation satisfy:
T  
B(b)
ρ
=

1 −  ρ(b)

ξ +  ρ(b)βa.
Let  b be the eﬃcient level of cognition:
T  
B( b)
ρ
= a.
Cognition is necessarily excessive if

1 −  ρ( b)

ξ>

1 −  ρ( b)β

a.
Finally, note that degradation is ineﬃcient if a+d>ξ ,w h e r ed is the negative externality
of degradation on the seller (see the main text).
Seller investment. The analysis is very similar to that of degradation. For notational
simplicity, we assume that a = 0, so eﬃcient cognition is  b = 0. States ω3 and ω4 are as
above. The other two ex post states are described as follows:
ω1:d e s i g nA is the best design and yields v − Δ (there is nothing to be done);
ω2: provided that the seller has already sunk private cost K>0, design A, which yields
v−Δ, can costlessly be turned (with the seller’s complicity) into design A  and thereby
deliver v to the buyer.
State ω1 has probability μ and state ω2 probability 1 − ρ − μ (if the state is ω2 but
the seller fails to invest, the ex post state reverts to ω1). Again, ex post payoﬀs UB(ωi)
do not include sunk cognition and investment costs.
One has:
UB(ω2)=UB(ω3),
(the VNM payoﬀ functions are the same in states ω2 and ω3),
T  
B(b)
ρ
= UB(ω4) − UB(ω3)
32(privately optimal cognition, assuming b ≥ 0).
UB(ω4)=β(v − c),
(bargaining over design A ),
1 − ρ − μ
1 − ρb

US(ω2) − US(ω1)

≥ K
⇐⇒
1 − ρ − μ
1 − ρb

UB(ω1) − UB(ω2)+Δ

≥ K
(seller investment is incentive compatible), and
μ
1 − ρb
UB(ω1)+
1 − ρ − μ
1 − ρb
UB(ω2)+
ρ(1 − b)
1 − ρb
UB(ω3)=β

v − c −
μ
1 − ρb
Δ − K

(ex ante bargaining over design A).
Combining these conditions yields:
T  
B(b)
ρ
=
 μ
1 − ρ − μ
+
β
1 − ρb

K − (1 − β)
μΔ
1 − ρb
.
In particular if μ is small, cognition is above the eﬃcient level.
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